15h: Two Problems of agglomeration for deontological bounded value function approaches Düvel Eike Decision-making under risk poses serious problems for normative theories operating with some concept of lexical priority. More specifically, they struggle with an answer to the question of how numerical probability modifies the strength of non-numerical value-bearers. In my presentation, I will focus on deontological theories and how they deal with risk. I will show that the bounded value function approach, proposed by Seth Lazar and Chad Lee-Stronach fails when faced with specific kinds of agglomeration problems. I will conclude that the approach fails because of the way in which decision-theoretic tools and deontology are combined.
15h20: Right to vote: does residence matter for epistemic reasons? Camille Pascal People moving into a country are generally not allowed to vote to national elections before a certain duration of residence. The view that only past residents should be allowed to vote relies on the following twofold assumption: the demos should be composed of people who are acquainted with the country and its political system, and such a knowledge is encapsulated by durational residency. The aim of this paper is twofold: 1) To understand what the epistemic requirements to voting should be; 2) To see whether such epistemic requirements are dependent on time and residence.
15h40: Moral responsibility as accountability for historical emissions: overcoming the excusable ignorance objection Garcia Portela, Laura The purpose of this paper is to focus on the use of the concept of moral responsibility that is in place in the debates about burden-sharing principle for climate justice, specifically with regards to the application of the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP). In particular, my aim will be to explore how the concept of moral responsibility has been used in the debate and the consequences it has had on the applicability of the principles. I will show that the excusable ignorance objection involves a particularly narrow understanding of the concept of moral responsibility (a volitionalist account of moral responsibility). I will further argue that that a wider understanding of moral responsibility as answerability (as part of a non-volitionalist account) can be applied to the case of historical emissions and that would pave the way to support the PPP. This will have two effects, at a conceptual level and at a practical level. At a conceptual level, it will show that there is at least conceptual space for defeating the excusable ignorance objection. At a practical level, as I will show, this understanding of moral responsibility would support the application of the PPP at least for the ‘measure of satisfactions’ involved in the so-called ‘loss and damage’ policies.
16h: Short break
16h10: What's wrong with an epistocratic council? Pierre-Etienne Vandamme Epistocracy is a neologism frequently used in recent philosophical works to refer to a form of government by those who are wiser than the mass. This kind of arrangement can be rejected on procedural grounds. I argue that it can also be rejected for epistemic reasons related to a lack of impartiality.
16h30: Reforming the refugee regime in Europe: A problem of democratic boundary Ali Emre Benli The significant increase in the number of asylum seekers arriving in the European Union territory since 2015 brought to light major shortcomings of the Common European Asylum System in facilitating refugees to enjoy their rights and member states to fulfill their duties. In response, a variety of reforms are being designed, debated and implemented under the new European Agenda on Migration. Asylum seekers, nevertheless, lack any significant means to influence decision-making processes, which, I claim, undermines its democratic character. In this article, I develop an argument for the inclusion of asylum seekers in the deliberations regarding the reform and functioning of the refugee regime drawing on the literature of boundary in democratic theory. I first critically discuss all affected, all subjected and equal influence solutions to the boundary problem in terms of their ability to meet up minimal conditions of democracy, and at the same time, applicability in current circumstances. After that, I propose a forward-looking interpretation of principle of equal influence, which I claim is able to justify inclusion of asylum seekers in the deliberations. The justification for inclusion, nevertheless, requires three further grounds: first, the moral claim of refugees to become a part of a political community that is able sustain their human rights; second, the explicit commitment of asylum seekers in Europe to become part of the European political community; and third, the particular features of refugee related institutions of Europe that allow a multi-level governance. Finally, I conclude by considering a number of obstacles to functioning of a democratic refugee regime in Europe.
16h50: Democratic Legitimation: Limited or Unlimited? Paulo, Norbert In this paper, I question the notion of democratic legitimacy presupposed by Abizadeh, Miller and many others in the debate about the boundary problem of democracy and its implications for the ethics of immigration. This presupposed notion is that democratic participation provides “unlimited justification” in this sense: A certain policy or law simply “is” democratically justified, all things considered, when all those affected or subjected to coercion by a certain decision had a say in in the decision-making process. I shall argue that a “limited” notion of democratic legitimacy is superior. The limited notion has it that democratic participation justifies only vis-à-vis those individuals who had a say in the decision. With the latter notion in mind, the boundary problem does not seem to be particularly helpful for the ethics of immigration. That is to say, limited democratic legitimacy does not warrant inclusion of potential immigrants.